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An extremist autarky: the systemic separation of the French Extreme Right 
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Introduction 
 
The 2002 legislative and presidential elections bore testimony to the consolidation of the 
position of the Extreme Right in the French political system as a strong mobilisatory 
force, despite hasty predictions of decline in 1999 subsequent to the split by the 
Mouvement National Républicain (MNR) from the Front National (FN). Beyond the 
specific circumstances of the elections which allowed Jean-Marie Le Pen to progress to 
the second round, but which saw a relative drop for FN and MNR candidates in the 
subsequent legislative ballots, the Extreme Right vote has a number of specific 
characteristics which raise it above the status of a simple protest vote which has so often 
been used to characterise Le Pen and his party’s support. In the subsequent 2004 
Parliamentary and regional elections, the party performed equally strongly relative to its 
2002 legislative score, unlike its Moderate Right counterparts who experienced a major 
defeat at the hands of the Left in both. 
 
The FN has undoubtedly enjoyed a renaissance on the back of these elections, 
particularly in its hegemony of the Extreme Right space over the essentially moribund 
party led by Bruno Mégret. However, the party seems as isolated as ever from the rest of 
the party system, and in particular from the mainstream Right. It has been incapable of 
building itself a legislative role consonant with its electoral capital, and has consequently 
only ever been able to exploit its nuisance and protest potential, instead of joining its 
moderate neighbours in the corridors of power, in the way that the Italian Extreme Right 
has managed.  
 
To this extent, the electoral fortunes of the two Extreme Right parties are of 
proportionately greater interest in studying these parties given that in the intervening 
periods, media blackouts and non-insertion in power, the parties’ presence declines 
considerably. This paper will consider the implantation of the FN in its current role as 
anti-system party par excellence in the French system, and look at the institutional and 
electoral reasons which prevent it from becoming part of the Right bloc to which in many 
ways it clearly belongs. 
 
The electoral implantation of the Extreme Right 
 
(Table 1 about here.) 
 
The electoral results of the FN and MNR in May / June 2002 are worth considering as the 
culmination of the FN’s development since its first successes in the 1980s (see Table 1). 
Gathering 19.2% of the first round presidential vote, Jean-Marie Le Pen and Bruno 
Mégret once again confirmed the electoral potency of a political stream anchored firmly 
at the national as well as sub-national level. The drop in the legislative elections, where 
the parties gathered 12.4% of the first round vote across France, paradoxically points to 
the strength of loyalty of a core of Extreme Right voters who have given the FN one of 
the most stable partisan supports in France (Mayer 2002).  
 
The 1999 European elections followed by the 2001 municipal and cantonal elections, had 
already given some indication of the enduring strength of the two Extreme Right parties. 
In June 1999, their joint scores accounted for 9.1% of the vote – their worst result ever in 
a European ballot, but not as disastrous as some had predicted so soon after the split in 
the party between Le Pen and Mégret. What is more, the presence of the souverainiste 
Pasqua / De Villiers list and a high level of abstention also meant that just under one-
tenth of the vote was a more than credible result under the circumstances. 1  In the 
municipal elections of March 2001, the two Extreme Right parties experienced a small 
downturn on the 1995 result of 14.2%, with the FN receiving 12.2% and the MNR 11.3% 
in the communes where they fielded candidates. In total, the party lost on average 3.2% 
in the 262 towns with over 5 000 inhabitants where they stood for election in both 1995 
and 2001. Again, this drop is significant, but given the context for the two splinters of the 
originally cohesive FN, far from the ‘worst-case scenario’. Indeed, in the cantonal 
elections, the 10% of the vote won by the two parties is almost identical to the FN’s score 
in 1994 election. 2  From the party system perspective, the 2002 results clearly 
demonstrated the institutionalisation of the Extreme Right, and its ability to retain a 
foothold in its former bastions despite the schism. 
 
(Table 2 about here.) 
 
Despite the MNR presence, the FN managed to present candidate in all of the 2002 
mainland constituencies, with the exception of Bas-Rhin. In total, 566 FN representatives 
stood for election. Similarly, the mégretiste party stood in 569 constituencies (547 of 
them on the mainland) on the MNR ticket. As Table 2 shows, the two Extreme Right 
parties have relatively similar sociological profiles to their candidates. Most notably, both 
rose to the challenge presented by the gender parity laws with some of the highest levels 
of ‘feminisation’ amongst parties in France. In other respects, the parties are even more 
similar – average age over 50, over-representation of the self-employed, heads of 
business and the retired, backed up by white-collar employees and other inactive groups 
(mainly women). 
 
The second important point of convergence lies in the almost identical manifestos 
presented by the two parties – hardly a surprise, given Bruno Mégret’s importance in 
defining FN ideology prior to 1999. Both revolved around familiar national-populist 
themes: immigration and xenophobia; authoritarianism, moral conservatism and hard-line 
law-and-order policy; a mixed economic programme, combining anti-fiscal liberalism 
and national protectionism against globalisation, the United States and free trade; and a 
continued virulent anti-party stance, designed to delegitimise the mainstream parties and 
elites, and focusing on their collusion in cohabitation.3 
 
These themes were certainly in line with the aspirations and desires of the Extreme Right 
electorate. Le Pen’s voters in the first round of the presidential elections were particularly 
worried by the issues of law-and-order (74%), immigration (60%) and unemployment 
(31%), a standard triptych for FN voters since the 1984 European elections.4 Mégret 
voters invoked similar issues – law-and-order (68%), immigration (53%) and justice 
(46%), in keeping with their candidate’s hard line on delinquency and immigration 
(IPSOS-Vizzavi-Le Figaro-France 2 survey, 21 April 2002). 
 
Considering the stability of the issues supporting Extreme Right voting over a 20-year 
period, it is also important to highlight the growing loyalty of a pool of FN voters over 
the same period. Le Pen’s party has managed increasingly to stop relying upon very 
volatile one-time voters and instead stabilise a pool of voters accounting for around 80-
85% of his electorate between the two elections.5 By 2002, one could speak of a large 
group of voters manifesting an almost anachronistic type of party identification for the 
FN. In the first round of the 2002 presidentials, 90% of Le Pen’s 1995 voters remained 
with one of the two Extreme Right candidates.6 In total, Extreme Right leaders took back 
86% of the FN support from 1997. 
 
Table 3 about here. 
 
This gradual stabilisation of the Extreme Right’s support has been accompanied by a shift 
in the sociodemographic profile of this electorate, starting in the 1988 presidential 
elections and clearly visible by the 2002 vote (see Table 3). In terms of gender, the 
Extreme Right electorate has remained consistently male, the gap being noticeable in 
both rounds of the 2002 election (+7 and +15 respectively) and to a lesser degree in the 
legislative elections (+3). The FN and MNR also continue to recruit support amongst the 
youngest strata, in particular those under 25 who are traditionally most open to Extreme 
Right voting.  
 
The age shift has been accompanied by a major sea-change in the occupational profile of 
the parties. Since the late 1980s, electoral support for the old Poujadist deputy has 
undergone a noticeable proletarianisation, including an important contingent of working-
class voters together with the classic petty bourgeois stream – artisans, tradesmen, small 
businessmen – who have supported the FN on the basis of neo-liberal economic views, 
and especially the anti-tax issue, prevalent in the party’s early programme (Perrineau, 
1997; Evans, 2000;; Mayer, 2002). 
 
This occupational synthesis is one of the key novelties associated with many successful 
Extreme Right parties (Kitschelt, 1994; Evans, 2005), and is certainly characteristic of Le 
Pen’s first round electorate – 29% of the self-employed and almost a third of workers. 
This working-class profile is logically linked to the low cultural and economic capital 
attributes of these voters – the FN and MNR are particular over-represented amongst the 
lowest educational strata and are under-represented amongst those with a higher 
education. Equally, those with the lowest incomes are most likely to support the Extreme 
Right. 
 
The importance attached to this development in the party’s electorate over the years is 
symbolised by the sudden swerve in the FN’s party programme after the 1995 
presidential election.7 Having become ‘the first party of the workers’, the FN leadership  
took great care to adopt a number of socially protectionist policies from the left, placing 
itself firmly in the camp which looks after the under-class and promotes an economic 
vision hostile to capitalism, globalisation, free-trade and the general liberalisation of the 
world economy (Swyngedouw and Ivaldi, 2001). The increased vote of the party amongst 
these ‘modernisation losers’ bears witness to the success of this strategy – 38% of the 
unemployed in the presidential first round for Le Pen; a quarter of the lowest income 
band; and 30% of the unemployed vote for the FN in the subsequent legislatives. 
 
(Table 4 about here.) 
 
Finally, the geographical spread of the FN vote is also stable in its key strongholds – an 
urban France faced with deindustrialisation, unemployment, an immigrant population and 
low law-and-order. In 2002, the FN and MNR votes fit the contours of the traditional 
national-populist areas: the Paris region, Nord Pas-de-Calais, Alsace, Rhône-Alpes and 
the Mediterranean sea-board (see Table 4).8 Such patterns were matched in the regional 
elections of 2004, where the FN scored over 19% of the vote – against an overall average 
of 13% - in Alsace, Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur (PACA) and Nord Pas-de-Calais. 
 
The 2002 context: presidential flow, legislative ebb 
 
In spring 2002, the Extreme Right vote again represented the totality of worries and 
traumas which urban post-industrial France had experienced through its years of 
economic recession and unemployment, breakdowns in law-and-order and painful facing-
up to modernity. As elsewhere in Western Europe, the success of the FN betrayed an 
enormous representational abyss cutting off elites from their citizens.9  Many French 
people’s questions about economic insecurity, delinquency, threats to the French model 
of social justice, and the apparent inability of the main governing parties to address the 
separation of society into ‘two Frances’ and the emergence of a new European and world 
order all lay behind this. 
 
Nevertheless, the specific context in 2002 of ‘simultaneous’ presidential and legislative 
elections was key. Unlike other party formations in the systems, the Extreme Right’s 
electoral success remains linked to conjunctural dynamics, and to the state of party 
competition and whether it will offer a propitious political opportunity structure to such 
peripheral actors. In this respect, two key ‘moments’ of the 2002 elections are worth 
studying in depth – the progression of Le Pen to the second round of the Presidential 
elections, and the legislative fallback. 
 
The shock of 21 April 2002 
 
In garnering almost 20% of the vote (> 5 400 000 voters) in the first round of the 
presidential election, the Extreme Right parties clearly made the most of their electoral 
potential and found the resources necessary to achieve their best result ever. 10  In 
comparison to the previous presidential election of 1995, the FN and MNR’s vote 
increased by 900 901 votes. In April 2002, Le Pen came first in almost one-third of 
mainland departments – 35 in total – and surpassed the 20% threshold in 28% of 
constituencies. 
 
The increase in FN / MNR vote went beyond the classic lepéniste limits: the gains for 
both leaders were spread across the entire country, with a rise in no less than 98%  of 
mainland constituencies, and most notably in certain target zones, particularly rural and 
rural-urban regions.11 A regression analysis of the evolution in abstention and vote for the 
main party formations relative to presidential voters in 1995 and 2002 clarifies the 
complex nature of the Extreme Right’s success. The latter appears to have gained 
amongst former abstainers located in the least participatory regions, from the reduction in 
left-wing candidates and the decreased influence of the Moderate Right.12 This pattern is 
confirmed by IPSOS exit polls, with Le Pen and Mégret’s electorates including 5% of 
Robert Hue, 7% of Lionel Jospin, 16% of Edouard Balladur and 12% of Jacques Chirac’s 
first round voters from 1995 (IPSOS-Vizzavi-Le Figaro-France 2, 21 April 2002). 
 
These results are directly linked to the logic of the 2002 presidential election and the 
socio-political issues which framed this vote. As we have already noted, a major 
motivation for the Extreme Right vote, and particularly in 2002, was the growing feeling 
of insecurity. An issue of polarising salience but largely ignored by the mainstream 
parties until recently, this question has increasingly dominated public life not least due to 
the media’s melodramatic and sometimes hysterical reporting of certain events. A basic 
demand for security exacerbated by the growth in delinquency has proved remediable – 
at least in the public’s eyes – only through a repressive authoritarian discourse amply and 
almost exclusively provided by the Extreme Right over the last 30 years.13  
 
The disruption of the international stage since 9/11 has also played an amplifying role 
with regard to worries over delinquency. The simultaneity of discussion over both anti-
terrorist military actions and the need to toughen up on immigration laws has confused 
the two in the public’s mind and helped forge a fallacious link between crime and 
immigration. The dismantling of Al Qaeda ‘networks’ in France has exaggerated the 
internal threat of terrorism and conversely seems to legitimise the FN and MNR’s anti-
Islamic rhetoric. The slowing of economic growth and the new rise in unemployment 
have both added to this general impression of crisis, and more specifically the weakening 
in credibility of the main party leaders’ programmes for regeneration presented in their 
election manifestos. 
 
From the political perspective, the first round of the 2002 presidential election remains 
notable for its high level of abstention (+6.8% on 1995), growing party fragmentation, 
the proportionalisation of choice,14 and the growing rejection of the governing parties. 
Such factors have benefited a number of marginal actors, and not just the FN and MNR, 
as we have noted: the exceptionally high scores for the three Trotskyite candidates, 
totalling 10.4%, were also a sanction against the tired cohabitation of the previous 
administration which had been adjudged impotent and immobile through the convergence 
of ideology and actions of Lionel Jospin, its Prime Minister, and Jacques Chirac, its 
president. In this respect, the anti-establishment rhetoric of the Extreme Right parties has 
consistently demonstrated an aptitude for exploiting the confusion and loss of 
benchmarks amongst the mainstream caused by 15 years of hyper-alternance.15 
 
The last element to this presidential success is the strengthening of the Extreme Right 
vote outside its usual areas of success – the East, the North and the Mediterranean sea-
board – and in particular the rural / rural-urban zones which had never previously 
constituted particularly fertile ground for national-populism. For example, as many as 
26% of farmers and 23% of rural inhabitants voted for Le Pen and Mégret together 
(IPSOS-Vizzavi-Le Figaro-France 2, 21 April 2002). In these areas, the Extreme Right 
seems to have been able to attract a new clientele not just on the basis of the delinquency 
issue, which nowadays extends well beyond towns and cities, but also on issues of anti-
tax, anti-globalisation and anti-Europe, by appealing to an electorate worried about the 
future developments in the CAP, particularly after Enlargement. 
 
In 2002, the cleavage opposing pro- and anti-Maastricht sentiment resurfaced in an 
Extreme Right guise, symptomatic of a general anti-system malaise amongst a certain 
section of the French electorate (Belot and Cautres, 2004). Across 555 mainland 
constituencies, the Le Pen vote in the first and second rounds appeared significantly 
correlated (+0.418 and +0.594, respectively) with the 1992 No vote in the Maastricht 
referendum – a stronger association than in the 1995 election, for example (+0.256). The 
zones with the greatest increase in Extreme Right vote between 1995 and 2002 are 
equally those with the highest levels of No vote. In the second round of the election, the 
FN candidate managed to win 31% of those who had voted No in September 1992 
(IPSOS-Vizzavi-Le Figaro-France 2, 5 May 2002).16  
 
The second round of the presidential election underlined, however, the limits to this 
Extreme Right resurgence, and clearly delineated the true constituency of these parties. 
The ‘divine surprise’ of 21 April engendered some unrealistic hopes amongst supporters 
of Le Pen, and had pushed the candidate himself to predict a second-round vote of one-
third of the voters – a bar he missed by some margin, winning only 17.8%. Le Pen 
managed to hold onto his electorate from the first round, but added a meagre 54 168 
votes to the score of the two first-round Extreme Right candidates combined.17 Only in 
just over one-third of mainland constituencies did he break through the 20% ceiling and 
made modest gains in only around half. 
 
This situation probably mirrors the limits of a ‘protest’ explanation of the Extreme Right 
vote. More than 5.5 million voters continued to express their disaffection with 
mainstream candidates and parties via Le Pen in the deciding round of a major election 
and hoped to see political influence derive from the potential outcome of their candidate 
doing much better than simply the combined total of the two first-round scores. This 
solidity is all the more surprising given the context of anti-FN demonstrations of an 
unprecedented level, together with calls for an anti-Extreme Right vote from personalities 
across all spheres of public life. It is still difficult to estimate precisely the extent to 
which the anti-Le Pen and pro-Republican discourse of the campaign contributed to 
stifling any hope the FN leader had of increasing his score. Despite a process of 
ideological ‘cleaning’ and a search for respectability, Le Pen appears to have continued to 
suffer from a lack of governing credibility, together with a reputation as an Extreme 
Right militant – and a radical one at that. 
 
The legislative reversal 
 
Next to the presidential elections, the outcome of the legislative elections seems like a 
relative failure for the FN, which had been seen on the eve of the elections as a possible 
deciding factor in more than 300 second-ballots and three-way run-offs. At the first 
round, the FN managed 11.12% of the vote, and the MNR could only scrape together 
1.08%. In total, the Extreme Right lost over 2 million voters relative to the presidentials, 
and dropped back to its 1993 level. 
 
In the end, the FN could only stand in 37 second-round ballots (27 of these straight two-
way run-offs) and won none of these. Its figureheads tried in vain to mobilise voters for 
the second round – Bruno Gollnisch in the Rhône; Marine Le Pen in the Pas-de-Calais; 
Marie-France Stirbois in Nice, and Jean-Claude Martinez in the Hérault. Others, such as 
Martine Lehideux in Paris or Carl Lang in Nord did not win sufficient votes to progress 
to the second round. In Orange, Jacques Bompard, re-elected mayor in 2001 and the main 
chance of winning a deputy, only received 42.4% of the second-round vote. 
 
(Table 5 about here.) 
 
For its part, the MNR could not capitalise upon its local strength, notably in the Bouches-
du-Rhône and Alsace. Bruno Mégret was soundly beaten in Vitrolles, with only 18.6% of 
the vote, as compared with 35.5% in 1997. In Gardanne, Damien Bariller managed only a 
meagre 3.7% (Table 5). As evident as it is, this downturn for the Extreme Right, and in 
particular for the FN, should nevertheless be seen in the context of the legislative 
elections of 2002, just as Le Pen’s success needs to be interpreted in a similar manner – 
through party competition and the political opportunity structure open to the two parties. 
 
Recall, firstly, that legislative elections in France have never been auspicious for the 
Extreme Right, or for new and emerging parties more generally. The majoritarian 
electoral system, the need for a local power-base and the possession of notables have all 
tended to advantage the major party groupings at the expense of more peripheral actors. 
In 1988, for example, the surge in support for Le Pen at the presidential election was not 
followed by an upturn in the FN vote at the subsequent legislatives. In 2002, the 
resistance to the FN demonstrated by the massive Republican vote in the second round 
gave little hope to FN candidates of seeing their names on the second-round ballot-paper. 
Add to this the impossibility of any cooperation with the new Parliamentary majority 
gathered behind the re-elected president, and it is easy to see why many FN voters would 
have preferred to abstain than bother with a vote ‘wasted’ in advance. 
 
At the same time, another portion of the Le Pen and Mégret voters from the month before 
could well have been attracted by the possibility of a tactical vote for the Moderate Right 
to counter the risks engendered by votes spread too thinly. In fact, the rallying dynamic 
initiated by the UMP worked as a veritable ‘victory machine’, once again demonstrating 
the strength which the Right enjoys when it is not riven by discord. By presenting single 
candidates in almost 93% of constituencies, the young UMP modified political supply  
enough to win back a number of prodigal Extreme Right defectors, and offer voters a 
landslide majority to dispense with the highly unpopular cohabitation predecessor. 
 
The personality of the Prime Minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, and the emphasis put on the 
notions of ‘closeness’ and ‘action’ by the government clearly coincided with the 
electorate’s wishes, though the extent to which Raffarin has been able to exploit this 
successfully over the past three years is doubtful, as Kuhn notes elsewhere in this 
volume. From an ideological perspective, the move to the Right by the new executive on 
security, taxation and a critique of cohabitation certainly convinced a segment of the 
petty bourgeoisie to return from Le Pen and Mégret. 
 
A regression analysis of the evolution in abstention and the main party groupings in the 
legislatives – Extreme Left, Pluralist Left, Moderate Right and Extreme Right – between 
the first presidential and legislative rounds broadly confirms the hypothesis that the 
Extreme Right lost to both abstention and the Moderate Right.18 Surveys carried out the 
day of the vote corroborate these ecological analyses: of 100 Le Pen voters at the first 
round of the presidential elections, 28 declared that they had not voted at the legislative 
elections (as opposed to only 11 mégretiste abstainers). The FN in particular seems to 
have lost the least politicised component of its presidential pool. As for those Extreme 
Right voters who turned out: 22% of Le Pen supporters preferred to pick a Moderate 
Right or Centre candidate, as opposed to 72% who stayed faithful to their party. For its 
part, almost a third of the Mégret electorate preferred the Moderate Right (IPSOS-
Vizzavi-Le Figaro-France 2 survey, 9 June 2002). 
 
The Extreme Right balance of power and systemic isolation 
Concerning intra-Extreme Right competition between the two parties, this had very little 
effect on the first round of the legislative elections, except in a handful of high-profile 
constituencies where brotherly hate was a factor involved in loss at the first round. If we 
hypothesise an anti-monde with a single Extreme Right party in this election – simply by 
adding the two parties’ scores together, and ignoring any electoral added value 
potentially accrued from unity – this party would have just reached the 12.5% threshold 
necessary to progress to the second round in a mere 18 extra constituencies.19  
 
Overall, the mégretiste faction had very little effect on the national-populist electorate, 
indicating the blatant failure by its leader to build a ‘national Right’ bloc between the 
Moderate Right and the Extreme Right, along the lines of the MSI-AN in Italy. 
Mégretisme failed in particular to resolve the fundamental contradiction between Le 
Pen’s anti-system populism and any sort of technocratic respectability or credibility. 
Since the split of 1999, the FN seems to have been able to assert its hegemonic position 
on the Extreme Right (Ivaldi 1999b). The European elections in June 1999 confirmed a 
ratio of 1/3-2/3 in favour of Le Pen’s party with 5.8% ahead of Mégret’s 3.3%.  
 
Electoral defeat today has been joined by severe financial and legal difficulties. In March 
2000, the Paris Cour d’Appel confirmed the decision to grant legal ownership of the FN 
name and logo to Le Pen and deprive the mégretiste organization of any share of the FN’s 
coffers. The pitiful European score in 1999, followed by an equally disastrous showing at 
the 2002 presidentials, have increased the burden of a party which cannot pretend to be 
able to cover its campaign costs. In the summer of 2002, the MNR leader saw the 
collapse of his citadel in Vitrolles and the forced departure of his wife from the town hall 
after the annulment of the municipal election result of 2001. All this against the context 
of revelations of close links with certain radical Right-wing groups and a failed attempt 
on the life of Maxim Brunerie, a former MNR candidate in Paris. 
 
These successive blows to a party already weakened by its electoral failure places a large 
question-mark over the political future of the MNR and its leaders. It leaves open the 
possibility of an eventual return to the FN of part of the activist base who originally 
believed in the mégretiste project. This has not allowed the FN to leave its political 
isolation, however. If the 2002 elections have taught us anything, it is the paradox that, 
despite its electoral success, the FN remains confined to the margins of mainstream 
politics, and is even less qualified now to form any alliance with the Moderate Right. 
 
Yet this is in spite of the FN’s strategy after the second round of the presidential elections 
to hold out its hand to any Moderate Right-wingers who would contemplate an alliance 
with the Extreme Right, in the (misguided) belief that they could expect a positive 
response from a parliamentary Right worried about the Extreme Right’s legislative 
potential. In 2002, the notably more conciliatory tone of the FN, as compared with its 
scorched earth policy between 1995 and 1997, showed the will of the party to ‘relocate’ 
(Ivaldi 2002). Its failure has been in no small part due to the refusal by Moderate Right 
leaders, and in particular Jacques Chirac, to countenance such cooperation. 
 
Conclusion: what future for the Extreme Right in France? 
The chapter of the 2002 presidential and legislative elections closes on the electoral 
consolidation of the Extreme Right and its continued banishment on the margins. Beyond 
strictly conjunctural effects, the main lessons from these elections encourages us to 
consider the possibility of the progressive implantation of an ideological family which 
thus far has remained silent and held outside mainstream political discourse. Whilst there 
is debate over the extent to which the Extreme Right should be considered a separate 
political bloc (Andersen and Evans, 2003; Grunberg and Schweisguth, 2003), there is 
undoubtedly a political constituency which sees its political views best represented by a 
party which is held at arm’s length by its mainstream neighbours. In other countries 
where the Extreme Right has enjoyed similar levels of success to the FN during the 
1990s, the weight of numbers has seen the parties in two cases – Italy and Austria – push 
their way into national legislative positions, and in two other cases – Denmark and 
Norway – become highly influential policy-brokers in Parliaments with small governing 
majorities. 
 
In France, the institutional framework and the particularly vituperative hostility to a party 
that has made no concessions on the radicality of its discourse has ensured that the 
electoral weight of the party has been unable to provide any sort of legislative return. 
Indeed, in the 2004 regional elections, a relatively strong return - although one which saw 
a drop of 5% on its 1998 score – provided no subnational governmental positions either, 
with the Left dominating 19 of the 22 regional councils and clearly never expected to 
extend a coalition hand to the FN as the UDF had done six years previously.  
 
But electoral reforms prior to these elections meant that the UDF would not have needed 
to do this to retain control of regional councils, either: the changes in the system, 
although originally rejected by the Constitutional Council and consequently modified in a 
more moderate version, were expressly designed to give the winning list a premium of 
seats to ensure a majority without necessary recourse to the FN, and a higher first-round 
threshold for standing in the second round, to reduce the number of triangulaires. 155 
seats displayed the loyalty of its core electorate once more, but the bargaining position of 
1998 had evaporated (Delwit, 2004: 585). 
 
In similar vein to Le Pen’s ineligibility to stand in the PACA region due to non-proof of 
residence, the politico-institutional culture excludes the Extreme Right from power-
sharing as a matter of course. Whether this entrenches the loyalty of the self-perceived 
exclus who support the FN is a moot point. What is certain is that it limits the FN’s 
ability to influence and collude at the national and, increasingly, at the subnational level. 
Its survival then, similar to the PCF in the post-war period, relies upon its ability to 
construct a social and political microcosm which it can use to encapsulate its supporters 
and provide a raison d’être beyond a simple protest every couple of years at election time. 
Unlike the PCF, however, the FN lacks external support and collusion to help it in this.   
 
Beyond this, the ideas of the FN’s leader are shared by a broad proportion of the 
electorate, and have entered the realm of public debate since the 1980s.20 However, such 
issues have now been absorbed by the mainstream parties – on law-and-order, for 
instance, Nicolas Sarkozy has adopted a strongly conservative-authoritarian line on crime 
at least partly in an attempt to steal the FN’s thunder on this issue. On other issues, such 
as Europe, there is evidence that the party’s hard-line stance is a function of Jean-Marie 
Le Pen’s own perspective – on his succession, others will not necessarily retain such a 
stance.21 The possibility of the FN – or indeed the MNR – winning new support on this 
basis seems limited, then. Its strength consequently lies in the loyalty of its core support, 
around 10% of the French electorate. If the party can retain this, through social and 
political encapsulation, then its existence in glorious isolation is assured. Whether it can 
continue to provide sufficient returns to these voters in such political isolation seems less 
assured. 
 
Notes 
 
1 Surveys from 1999 confirm a large number of former FN voters amongst the Pasqua-
De Villiers support: between 10 and 17%, according to the survey (Ivaldi, 1999a). 
2  To boot, the Extreme Right won symbolic victories in Orange, Marignane and 
Vitrolles. In Orange, the incumbent mayor, Jacques Bompard (FN), was re-elected at the 
first round with almost 60%. Daniel Simonpieri (MNR) won with over 65% of the vote 
 against the Moderate Right candidate Guy Martin, who progressed to the second round 
after the PS candidate stood down. In Vitrolles, Catherine Mégret won with 45.3% in a 
three-way run-off against the Moderate Left and Right. 
3 For a detailed analysis of the ideological content of the Extreme Right programme, see 
Ivaldi (2001). 
4 Recall that, for two-thirds of the 1997 FN electorate, unemployment and immigration 
were the two principal issues related to Extreme Right vote (CSA-Le Parisien survey, 26 
May 1997). 
5 In the first round of the 1997 legislative election, FN candidates received more than 
80% of their support from those who had voted Le Pen two years previously. 
6 Similar data have been provided by the Institut Louis-Harris: in the first round of the 
presidential election, Jean-Marie Le Pen kept 83% of his 1995 electorate, as well as 5.5% 
who moved to Mégret (Louis-Harris-Libération-AOL survey, 21 April 2002).  
7 On the doctrinal change, see Ivaldi (1998). 
8 The geographical spread of the Extreme Right vote has proved remarkably stable, as 
correlation coefficients amongst the 555 mainland constituencies demonstrate – between 
the first rounds of the 1995 and 2002 presidential elections (r  = 0.916) and the 1997 and 
2002 legislative elections (r = 0.903).  
9 For a comparison of European electoral dynamics amongst Extreme Right parties, see 
Evans and Ivaldi (2002). 
10  This achievement is all the more impressive given the effective media blackout 
imposed upon Le Pen and Mégret subsequent to the party split in 1999, which presented 
them with very little campaign space, the media concentrating on the two presumed 
second-round candidates, Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin. Indeed, much of the column-
space allocated to Le Pen emphasised the problems he was having in collecting the 
requisite number of signatures for his candidacy, and suggested he might repeat the 
debacle of 1981 when he was unable to stand for this reason. 
11 The correlation between 1995 and 2002 Extreme Right vote increase and vote in 1995 
is indeed negative (r = -0.121, p < 0.01) 
12 Linear regression on 555 mainland constituencies: R2 = 0.67; t-values: abstention (-
20.995); Moderate Left presence (-22.425); Moderate Right presence (-21.173), all 
significant at p < 0.001. 
13 The Extreme Right’s issue-ownership of criminality and law-and-order is a theme 
common to parties across Europe (Ivaldi, 2002). 
14 On the concept of ‘proportionalisation’ in a majoritarian context, see Parodi (1997).  
15 For a discussion of hyper-alternance, see Evans and Ivaldi (2002). 
16 On growing implantation of Europe as a potential cleavage in France (unlike other EU 
member-states), see Andersen and Evans (2005). 
17 Geographically, the Le Pen vote at the second round covered almost exactly the same 
zones as the first-round vote. 
18 Linear regression on 555 mainland constituencies: R2 = 0.67; t-values: abstention (-
27.205); Moderate Left presence (-12.601); Moderate Right presence (-18.720), all 
significant at p < 0.001. 
19  This would also have eliminated the fiascos which hamstrung two of the major 
personalities: in Vitrolles, Bruno Mégret himself would doubtless have won the first 
 round ahead of the PS and UMP, had the FN candidate not ‘stolen’ 13.3% of his vote. 
Conversely, in the 20th constituency of Nord, Carl Lang would have progressed to the 
second round if he had enjoyed the support of the 431 voters who chose his MNR rival. 
20 An analysis of SOFRES survey results about support for Le Pen’s ideas over the 
period 1984-2002 demonstrate a stable core of support of between 20 and 25% of 
respondents who declare themselves to be in agreement with the Extreme Right’s policy-
stances (SOFRES-Le Monde-RTL, 23-24 May 2002). 
21 Marine Le Pen, his daughter and possible successor at the helm of the party, has 
publicly stated that the FN must adapt to context and consequently espouse a more pro-
European line (Evans 2005b). 
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Table 1  FN and MNR national election results (1983-2004) 
 
 Election % Post-1999 split 
1984 European 11.4 - 
1986 Legislatives 9.8 - 
1988 Presidential 14.4 - 
1988 Legislatives 9.7 - 
1989 European 11.7 - 
1993 Legislatives 12.4 - 
1994 European 10.5 - 
1995 Presidential 15.0 - 
1997 Legislatives 15.1 - 
1999 European 9.1 5.8 FN 
3.3 MNR 
2002 Presidential 19.2 
17.8 
16.9 Le Pen 
2.3 Mégret 
2002 Legislative 12.4 11.1 FN 
1.1 MNR 
0.2 Other ER 
2004 European 10.13 
 
9.81 Le Pen 
0.32 Mégret 
 
Table 2  Sociological profile of FN and MNR candidates in June 2002 legislative 
elections 
 
 FN 
(N=566) 
MNR 
(N= 569) 
Gender   
Male 51.4 58.9 
Female 48.6 41.1 
Average age 53.0 51.5 
Occupation   
Farmers 3.1 2.6 
Self-employed 13.0 10.4 
Professions / upper managerial 21.4 22.1 
Middle managerial 7.8 7.4 
White-collar employees 17.6 20.8 
Blue-collar 1.9 3.6 
Retired 23.7 23.1 
Other inactive 11.6 10.0 
 
Table 3  Sociological profile of FN and MNR voters in the 2002 legislative and 
presidential elections 
 
 Presidential Legislatives 
 First round Second round First round 
 
% 
 
Le Pen 
 
Mégret 
 
Le Pen 
 
FN 
 
MNR 
 
Total 
 
17 
 
2 
 
18 
 
11 
 
1 
Gender      
Male 21 2 26 13 1 
Female 13 3 11 10 1 
Age      
18-24 16 2 7 6 2 
25-34 17 3 22 13 1 
35-44 16 3 19 13 2 
45-59 19 2 18 13  
60-69 18 1 22 9  
70+ 15 3 17 10 1 
Occupation      
Farmers 20 6 17   
Self-employed 19  19 12  
Professionals / 
upper 
managerial 
8 1 9 7 2 
Middle-
managerial 
14 1 13 9  
White-collar 
employees 
16 4 18 20  
Blue-collar 30 3 17 10 1 
Status      
Private-sector 17 3 20 11 1 
Public-sector 17 2 16 12 1 
Independent 17 1 29 12  
Unemployed 38 2 11 30  
Students 15 2 2 5 2 
Retired 16 2 20 8 1 
Education      
Primary 22 3 22 15 1 
Secondary 22 2 22 9 1 
Tertiary 8 2 9 7 1 
Income      
Low 23 4 21 11 1 
Medium 18 3 20 12 1 
High 11 1 8 9 0 
 
Source: IPSOS-Vizzavi-Le Figaro-France 2 surveys, 21 April, 5 May and 9 June 
Table 4  Territorial spread of Extreme Right vote in 2002 
 
Le Pen + Mégret, 1st round 
presidential 2002 
Le Pen, 2nd round presidential 
2002 
FN+MNR 1st round legislatives 
2002 
 
Vaucluse 
 
29.74 
 
Vaucluse 
 
29.64 
 
Vaucluse 
 
25.34 
Alpes-
Maritimes 
28.52 Var 28.69 Bouches-du-
Rhône 
21.83 
Haut-Rhin 28.51 Alpes-
Maritimes 
28.68 Var 21.65 
Gard 27.96 Bouches-du-
Rhône 
27.46 Alpes-
Maritimes 
21.16 
Bouches-du-
Rhône 
27.38 Gard 26.66 Gard 19.74 
Bas-Rhin 27.27 Pyrénées-
Orientales 
25.12 Aube 18.52 
Moselle 27.06 Oise 25.07 Oise 18.32 
Var 26.71 Aisne 24.57 Hérault 17.64 
Ardennes 26.52 Hérault 24.47 Pyrénées-
Orientales 
17.54 
Belfort 26.47 Haute-Saône 24.23 Yonne 17.48 
Oise 25.97 Ardennes 24.08 Haut-Rhin 17.43 
Haute-Saône 25.73 Haute-Marne 23.83 Haute-Saône 17.35 
Hérault 25.42 Aube 23.13 Belfort 17.00 
Ain  25.37 Yonne 22.67 Haute-Marne 16.64 
Haute-Marne 25.35 Haut-Rhin 22.35 Ain 16.47 
Loire 24.56 Corse-du-Sud 22.30 Aisne 16.28 
Yonne 24.44 Pas-de-Calais 22.19 Loire 15.84 
Aube 24.40 Belfort 22.08 Eure 15.82 
Aisne 23.83 Aude 22.07 Nord 15.68 
Vosges 23.75 Lot-et-Garonne 22.06 Ardennes 15.56 
Drôme 23.74 Moselle 21.88 Eure-et-Loir 15.56 
Pyrénées-
Orientales 
23.35 Meuse 21.78 Moselle 15.41 
Meuse 23.16 Eure 21.78 Drôme 15.33 
Haute-Savoie 23.13 Somme 21.74 Aude 15.30 
Tarn-et-
Garonne 
22.78 Nord 21.72 Seine-St-Denis 15.22 
Savoie 22.54 Tarn-et-
Garonne 
21.59 Rhône 15.02 
Eure 22.52 Ain 21.22 Seine-et-Marne 14.92 
Loiret 22.40 Vosges 21.19 Bas-Rhin 14.72 
Aude 22.30 Alpes-de-
Haute-
Provence 
21.17 Tarn-et-
Garonne 
14.70 
Marne 22.19 Eure-et-Loir 20.74 Loiret 14.52 
 
Table 5  Situation of the principal Extreme Right candidates in 2002 legislative elections 
 
              2002 legislatives 
% of vote 
Candidate Department 1st round 2nd round Configuration 
 
Carl Lang (FN) 
 
Nord 
 
18.7 
  
Marine Le Pen 
(FN) 
Pas de Calais 24.2 32.3 Duel 
Marie-France 
Stirbois (FN) 
Alpes-Maritimes 23.0 20.1 Triangular 
Jacques Bompard 
(FN) 
Vaucluse 34.1 42.4 Duel 
Jean-Claude 
Martinez (FN) 
Hérault 20.1 17.2 Triangular 
Martine Lehideux 
(FN) 
Paris 7.9   
Bruno Gollnisch 
(FN) 
Rhône 23.2 21.3 Triangular 
Bruno Mégret 
(MNR) 
Bouches du Rhône 18.6   
Jean-Yves Le 
Gallou (MNR) 
Hauts-de-Seine 4.1   
Damien Bariller 
(MNR) 
Bouches du Rhône 3.7   
 
